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Canadian Rape Shield Statutes
By MARY A. WAGNER*
Member of the Class of 1993
L INTRODUCTION
The late seventies and early eighties saw an increasing awareness
of the need to protect the rights of victims in criminal prosecutions in
both the United States and Canada.' Rape cases presented a particu-
lar area of concern resulting in the enactment of "rape shield stat-
utes."2 The debate resulting from the enactment of these laws centers
on the tension between ensuring the accused's right to a fair trial and
providing protection for the complainant?
In an attempt to balance these conflicting interests, Canada has
enacted a number of different statutes. In R. v. Seaboyer,4 and the
companion case of R. v. Gayme,5 the Supreme Court of Canada re-
viewed the constitutionality of the then-existing Canadian rape shield
statute. In a seven-to-two decision, the Court declared Canadian
* A.B. San Diego State University, 1988.
1. See Constance Backhouse & Loma Schoenroth, A Comparative Survey of Cana-
dian and American Rape Law, 6 CAN.-U.S. L J. 48 (1983).
2. Id. Some controversy surrounds the term "rape shield statute" itself In L v
Seaboyer, the majority indicates the term is misleading in that the protection afforded by
the statute is not against the crime of rape itself but from having the complainant's sexual
history introduced at trial. 2 S.C.R. 577, 604 (1991). The dissent, on the other hand, indi-
cates the problem with the term "rape shield statute" is that it implies that the purpose of
the statute is to shield victims from cross examination while other, perhaps more impor-
tant, purposes are involved. Id. at 648.
3. See Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Court-
room, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 41-72. Debate also surrounds the term used for the person
bringing the sexual assault charge. A variety of terms have been used. The dissent in ?. v.
Seaboyer evaluates a number of them and settles on "complainant" as, although harsh,
being the least offensive. 2 S.C.R. at 647-48. "Complainant" will be used throughout this
Note to describe the woman reporting the sexual assault. Id. "Prosecutrix" was rejected
by the dissent, as it is the State, not the victim who brings the charges; "alleged victim" was
also rejected as it connotes that the person has nothing to complain about. Id. As the vast
majority, though not all, of the complainants in sexual assault cases are female, feminine
nouns and pronouns will be used throughout this Note.
4. 2 S.C.R. 577 (1991).
5. Id.
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Criminal Code Section 276 unconstitutional while upholding the con-
stitutionality of section 277.6 A lengthy dissent delivered by Justice
L'Heureux-Dube and joined by Justice Gonthier followed the major-
ity opinion.7
This Note analyzes the Canadian Supreme Court's decision in R.
v. Seaboyer. It presents a brief overview of the Canadian legal system,
which is followed by a discussion of the evolution of Canada's rape
shield statutes. A description of the background facts and procedural
history in both the Seaboyer and Gayme cases follows. This Note also
sets out and evaluates the challenges before the court, and the reason-
ing of both the majority and dissenting opinions.
Before discussing Justice L'Heureux-Dube's dissent, this Note ex-
plores dissents in general: first looking at different court systems' ap-
proaches to the issuance of separate opinions, and then focusing on
the purpose or "role" of dissenting opinions. This discussion may
seem out of place in a Note concerning rape shield statutes; indeed,
the subject of separate opinions could be explored on its own in an-
other paper. However, general information regarding separate opin-
ions is helpful in understanding Justice L'Heureux-Dube's reasoning
in Seaboyer. Furthermore, a detailed look at the rhetoric and reason-
ing employed in judicial opinions though interesting in the abstract,
has little practical value unless it is discussed in a particular context
such as that used here -- rape shield statutes generally and Justice
L'Heureux-Dube's Seaboyer dissent specifically. Justice L'Heureux-
Dube's Seaboyer dissent illustrates how the author of a dissent can use
arguments not normally employed in a majority opinion. It also illus-
trates that in order to be persuasive as a judicial opinion, a dissent
must fulfill the less rigid, yet still present, expectations that accom-
pany any judicial opinion.
A call for new legislation began almost immediately after the is-
suance of the Seaboyer decision.- The Court handed down its decision
in August 1991, and in December 1991 Justice Minister Kim Campbell
introduced a bill regarding a new rape shield statute on the floor of
Parliament. In June 1992, Parliament adopted a new rape shield stat-
ute. This Note evaluates the provisions of this new legislation and
concludes that this "new" statute may contain the elements to allow it
to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 643.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Canadian Legal System
Canadian law is an interesting mix of common law and civil law
influences. The common law system brought by the English settlers
predominates and is the governing system in nine of the ten Canadian
provinces.' However, Quebec, the tenth province, derives some of its
law from the French civil system and follows a civil law approach for
"private" law and a common law approach for all other areas of law.9
This distinction, while interesting, does not play a role in the discus-
sion of the rape shield statutes at issue here because the majority of
the criminal law in Canada, including the rape shield statute, is
federal. 10
As in the United States, two separate court systems operate in
Canada: the federal courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada,
and the Provincial Courts." The Supreme Court of Canada hears ap-
peals from both the federal and provincial systems. All of the lower
courts are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court.12
The Supreme Court of Canada is made up of nine justices ap-
pointed by the Prime Minister. The justices may serve until the age of
seventy-five at which time they must retire. 3 In order to prevent the
undermining of Quebec's civil law system, three of the nine justices
must be from that province.14 Like the United States Supreme Court,
the Supreme Court of Canada now has significant control over its
docket.' The change to this discretionary system resulted from the
8. GERALD L. GALL, THE CANADiAN LEGAL SysT'm 38 (1977).
9. Id. at 38-39.
10. I. at 58-60.
11. Id. at 99.
12. I& at 9, 14. The obvious parallels to the United States federal and state court
systems seem almost too apparent to mention.
13. PETER McCoRMicK & IAN GREENE, JUDGES AND JUDoING 45 (1990). The tenure
of the Canadian Supreme Court Justices, which comes to a mandatory end at the age of 75,
differs from the length of service of the United States Supreme Court Justices upon whom
no mandatory retirement age is imposed. U.S. CONST. arLt. I, § 1.
14. McCoRuIcK & GREENE, supra note 13, at 45.
15. Id. at 193-94. Until 1974, the Supreme Court of Canada was required to hear a
number of appeals of right, including an appeal from any civil suit where the amount in
controversy was greater than $10,000 and an appeal from any capital criminal case. Id. at
193. Now the only appeal of right is from a criminal case where there was a dissent in the
Court of Appeal. I. at 194.
19931
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overwhelming number of appeals of right which filled the Court's
docket.16
B. Evolution of the Rape Shield Statutes
The Canadian laws governing the admissibility of sexual history
evidence in rape cases have undergone considerable change over the
last two decades. The permissive common law approach was followed
for a number of years.' 7 However, in the 1970s, the common law ap-
proach was revised to restrict the admissibility of sexual history evi-
dence.' 8 While the letter of the revised statute prevented the
introduction of sexual history evidence, an interpretation of the stat-
ute by the Canadian Supreme Court greatly limited the provision.1 9
In 1982, Parliament responded by enacting Canadian Criminal Code
Sections 276 and 277.20
Under the common law approach, which was embodied in Cana-
dian Criminal Code Section 142, evidence of a complainant's sexual
history with the accused and others was readily admissible at a rape
trial.2 ' A defendant could use such evidence to establish the com-
plainant's consent to the act at issue, or to show that she was an un-
chaste woman.2' Under section 142, a defendant could introduce
evidence of unchasteness to impeach the complainant's credibility as a
witness, as it was believed that an unchaste woman was more likely to
be untruthful.3 This evidence was highly prejudicial to the complain-
ant and often gave the impression that the complainant, not the ac-
cused, was the one on trial.24 The trial judge's discretion to exclude
prejudicial evidence could somewhat temper the harshness of this ap-
proach; for example, the judge could instruct the witness not to an-
swer a particular question on cross examination. Since the
information of unchasteness sought on cross examination went to the
16. Id
17. REPORT OF THE FEDERALJPROVINCIAL TASK FORCE ON UNIFORM RULES OF Evi.
DENCE 65 (Uniform Law Conference of Canada ed., 1982) [hereinafter REPORT ON Evi.
DENCE]; PETER K. McWILLIAMS, CANADIAN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 301 (1984).
18. McWILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 301.
19. Forsythe v. The Queen, 2 S.C.R. 268 (1980).
20. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 276-77 (1985) (§ 276 repealed 1992).
21. REPORT ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, at 65; MCWILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 301.
22. REPORT ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, at 66; MCWILLIAMS, supra note 17.
23. REPORT ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, at 67.
24. Id
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credibility of the witness, no evidence could be introduced by the de-
fense in response to a refusal to answer.25
In 1976, as a result of the prejudicial and discriminatory common
law rules, Parliament substantially revised Canadian Criminal Code
Section 142.6 It has been said that rape shield statutes in general, and
the revision to section 142 in particular, came about as a reaction to
the changing social attitude toward sexual behavior and the increasing
political influence of women in the 1970sP The revision to section
142 served two basic purposes: First, it eliminated non-probative evi-
dence, thereby preserving the integrity of the trial. 8 Second, it en-
couraged the reporting of rape incidents as the witness' privacy
received greater protection 29 These revisions embodied the first ef-
fort in Canada to provide some protection to rape victims?01
In theory, revised section 142 provided the complainant with
more protection than the common law rules.3 ' Revised section 142
provided that questions relating to the victim's past sexual conduct
could be presented only if reasonable notice had been given to the
witness 32 In addition, an in-camera hearing would be held to deter-
mine the relevancy and admissibility of the proffered evidence.3 3 The
notice provision was designed to prevent the witness and the prosecu-
tion from being surprised by the introduction of sexual history evi-
dence as well as to limit the defendant's use of such evidence? 4
Revised section 142 appeared to provide the necessary protection
for the victim, and at the same time allow the defendant the opportu-
nity to present relevant evidence. However, when the courts applied
the statute, the level of protection was less than satisfactory? 5 In For-
sythe v. The Queen,36 the Canadian Supreme Court's interpretation of
revised section 142 allowed the complainant to be compelled as a wit-
ness at the in-camera admissibility hearing, a result not available at
25. Id.
26. McWniLAMS, supra note 17, at 301.
27. Id.
28. Christine Boyle, Section 142 of the Criminal Code: A Trojan Horse?, 23 CrUM.
L.Q. 253, 255 (1980).
29. Id.
30. McWuniAs, supra note 17, at 301.
31. REPORT ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, at 71.
32. Criminal Law Amendment Act, ch. 93,1974-75-76 S.C. (repealed by Criminal Law
Amendment Act, ch. C-125, § 19, 1980-81-82-83 S.C.).
33. Id.
34. RFPORT ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, at 69.
35. Id.
36. 2 S.C.R. 268 (1980).
1993]
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common law.37 The Forsythe decision was highly criticized because it
stripped the complainant of the common law privilege to remain silent
and made her credibility a material issue.38
As a result of the Supreme Court's interpretation of revised sec-
tion 142 in Forsythe, Parliament repealed revised section 142 and en-
acted Criminal Code sections 246.6 and 246.7 in 1982.39 These
provisions were subsequently renumbered in 1985 as sections 276 and
277, respectively.40 These are the sections which were at issue in
Seaboyer.
Canadian Criminal Code Section 276 provided:
[Njo evidence shall be adduced by or on behalf of the accused con-
cerning the sexual activity of the complainant with any person other
than the accused unless:
(a) it is evidence that rebuts evidence of the complainant's sexual
activity or absence thereof that was previously adduced by the
prosecution;
(b) it is evidence of specific instances of the complainant's sexual
activity tending to establish the identity of the person who had sex-
ual contact with the complainant on the occasion set out in the
charge; or
(c) it is evidence of sexual activity that took place on the same
occasion as the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the
charge, where that evidence relates to the consent that the accused
alleges he believed was given by the complainant.41
Section 276 followed the "Michigan Model '42 of rape shield stat-
ute because it provided a general prohibition against introducing the
complainant's sexual history followed by a number of exceptions.
Although the "Michigan Model" statute appears to provide the great-
est protection for the complainant, this type of rape shield statute is
regarded as the most restrictive and the most objectionable in terms of
encroaching on the rights of the accused.43
37. Id. at 275-76.
38. REPORT ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, at 72. For an analysis of the Forsythe deci-
sion, see Boyle, supra note 28.
39. Criminal Law Amendment Act, ch. C-125, § 19, 1980-81-82-83 S.C. Not all com-
mentators favored the replacement of section 142. See, e.g., MCWILLIAMS, supra note 17,
at 301, 304.
40. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 276-277 (1985).
41. Id. § 276 (repealed 1992).
42. See MicH. Comp. LAws § 750.5200) (1991).
43. See, e.g., . Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws
and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544 (1979-1980); Berger, supra note 3.
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It is important to note that section 276, struck down in Seaboyer,
only excluded sexual history evidence of the complainant with "a per-
son other than the accused." Evidence of past sexual conduct be-
tween the accused and the complainant was not barred by section 276
and its admissibility was governed by the usual evidentiary standards
of relevance." Arguably, with the three general exceptions and the
availability of sexual history evidence between the accused and the
complainant, section 276 excluded little if any relevant evidence.
Section 276, like revised section 142, required notice prior to the
introduction of evidence of the complainant's sexual history, and the
court only admitted such evidence after an in-camera hearing.4 In
addition, section 276 specifically overturned the Forsythe decision by
providing that "the complainant is not a compellable witness" at the
in-camera hearing.' Thus, Parliament prevented the possibility of an
interpretational limitation similar to that given for section 142 in For-
sythe.47 It appears that by enacting section 276 Parliament recognized
the need to provide greater protection to the complainant in a rape
trial.
Canadian Criminal Code Section 277 states: "In sexual assault of-
fenses, evidence of sexual reputation, whether general or specific, is
not admissible for the purpose of challenging or supporting the credi-
bility of the complainant."'  This section expresses Parliament's de-
sire to provide greater protection for the complainant than that
available under revised section 142. Under the Court's interpretation
of revised section 142 in Forsythe, the witness' credibility is always
material.4 9 Section 277, however, explicitly indicates that evidence of
sexual reputation cannot be admitted on the issue of the complain-
ant's credibility as a witness.50
C. R. v. Seaboyer and R. v. Gayme
Seaboyer and Gayme were charged with sexual assault. Both
sought to introduce evidence in their defense of the complainants'
44. The usual relevancy determination provides that evidence is admissible if its pro-
bative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effects. See, eg., FED. R.
EviD. 403.
45. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 276(2), (3) (1985).
46. Id.
47. For an evaluation of these provisions, see Boyle, supra note 29.
48. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 277 (1985).
49. Boyle, supra note 28, at 150.
50. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 277 (1985).
1993]
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past sexual conduct." The preliminary inquiry judge who heard the
separate cases denied these requests and each defendant appealed the
decision.
Seaboyer sought to introduce sexual conduct evidence to rebut
evidence presented by the prosecution regarding the complainant's
physical condition.5 2 Previous sexual encounters, he argued, could
provide an explanation for her physical condition, including the
bruises which the prosecution introduced as evidence. Seaboyer ar-
gued that the complainant's past sexual conduct was relevant to the
issue of consent. 3 Therefore, he contended, it was error for the pre-
liminary inquiry judge not to allow the evidence. 4 Seaboyer was not
allowed to introduce evidence of the complainant's past sexual con-
duct on the ground that Criminal Code Sections 276 and 277 com-
pletely barred such evidence.55
Gayme was charged with sexually assaulting a fifteen-year-old
girl, who was his friend. 6 Gayme sought to introduce sexual history
evidence to support his defense of consent and an honest belief in
consent, as well as his assertion that the complainant was the sexual
aggressor. 7 The preliminary inquiry judge did not allow Gayme to
introduce evidence of the complainant's past sexual conduct.5 8 In ad-
dition, Gayme's motion foi an order declaring section 276 and section
277 unconstitutional was denied on the ground that the preliminary
inquiry judge lacked the jurisdiction to decide the issue.5 9 Both the
Seaboyer and the Gayme cases were committed for trial.60
The defendants appealed the decisions barring the introduction
of sexual conduct evidence to the Supreme Court of Ontario for an
order quashing the committal for trial.6 The defendants argued that
they were not given the opportunity to present a complete defense
due to the ruling that the sexual conduct evidence was inadmissible.62
The Supreme Court of Ontario held that both section 276 and section
51. R. v. Seaboyer, 2 S.C.R. at 598.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 599.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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277 violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.63 The
cases were remanded to the preliminary inquiry judge to allow the
evidence to be presented without the restraints of the Criminal Code
sections.64
The prosecution appealed the decision of the Supreme Court of
Ontario to the Ontario Court of Appeal.6 The Ontario Court of Ap-
peal concluded that the preliminary inquiry judge lacked jurisdiction
to determine the constitutionality of sections 276 and 277.1 There-
fore, the court concluded there was no error in the application of
these sections.67 Thus, the order granting the motion to quash was
reversed.68 However, the court went on to indicate that section 276
was unconstitutional, and the court split on the constitutionality of
section 277.69 In dicta, the court indicated that a trial judge should
determine whether the application of sections 276 and 277 in a partic-
ular case would constitute a breach of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.70
Both Seaboyer and Gayme appealed the decision of the Supreme
Court of Ontario to the Supreme Court of Canada challenging the
constitutionality of Criminal Code Sections 276 and 277.71
63. Id. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part of the Constitution Act of
1981, is similar to the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. The Charter, how-
ever, is more extensive than the Bill of Rights and has provisions regarding: "Fundamental
Freedoms" (section 2); "Democratic Rights" (sections 3-5); "Mobility Rights" (sections 6-
10); "Legal Rights" (sections 8-14); "Equality Rights" (section 15); "Official Languages of
Canada" (sections 16-22); "Minority Language Educational Rights" (section 23); and "En-
forcement" (section 24).
64. R. v. Seaboyer, 2 S.C.R. at 599.
65. Id. For an analysis of the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, see Yola Grant,
The Penetration of the Rape Shield: R v. Seaboyer and R. v. Gayme in the Ontario Court of
Appeal, 3 CAN. J. WomEN's L. 592 (1989-1990).
66. R. v. Seaboyer, 2 S.C.RI at 599.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 600.
70. Id. The view of the Ontario Court of Appeal regarding the application of the
doctrine of constitutional exemption was criticized as "reopen[ing] discretionary judicial
inquiry into women's sexual conduct, the very process Parliament intended to curb." See
Grant, supra note 66, at 596. Application of the doctrine of constitutional exemption was
considered and rejected by the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court. R. v. Seaboyer, 2
S.C.R. at 627-30.
71. R. v. Seaboyer, 2 S.C.R. at 607.
1993]
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111. THE MAJORITY'S ANALYSIS 72
A. Constitutionality of Section 276
In 1981 the Canadian Parliament adopted the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. The Charter encompasses many of the same
protections that are found in the Bill of Rights of the United States
Constitution.7' It is under the Charter that the Canadian Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of sections 276 and 277.
In the Seaboyer decision, the Court first addressed the constitu-
tionality of section 276 under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.74
Section 7 of the Charter provides: "Everyone has the right to life, lib-
erty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental jus-
tice."'75 Under section 11(d) of the Charter: "Any person charged
with an offense has the right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal. ' 76 The right to a fair trial provided by section
11(d) has been interpreted as part of the fundamental justice provided
for in section 7.77 The two sections are intertwined and are therefore
analyzed together.78
In determining the constitutionality of section 276, the court
looked both to its purpose, defined as the "ultimate aim of the legisla-
tion, '79 and to its effect, defined as the actual consequence of the leg-
islation in general, as well as the consequence to a particular
72. Justice McLachlin wrote the opinion for the majority and was joined by Justices
Lamer, La Forest, Sopinka, Cory, Stevenson, and lacobucci. Id. at 597.
73. See supra note 64.
74. R. v. Seaboyer, 2 S.C.R. at 602.
75. CAN. CONST. (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 7. This Charter pro-
vision resembles the protection of the guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the U.S. Constitution that no person will be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The majority's analysis in this decision
resembles the due process approach taken by the United States Supreme Court.
76. CAN. CONST. (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 11(d). This is similar
to the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution which provides that: "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have the compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
77. R. v. Seaboyer, 2 S.C.R. at 603.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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defendant.'n The majority recognized that section 276 served the
laudable purpose of replacing prejudicial common law rules."' In ad-
dition, the majority recognized that the legislation preserved the in-
tegrity of the trial, encouraged the reporting of crime, and provided
some protection for the witness' privacy.82 Although the majority rec-
ognized these purposes and found them to "conform to our funda-
mental conceptions of justice,"' 3 it determined that the effect of the
law infringed on the defendant's right to a fair trial, and this effect
overcame these recognized legitimate purposes.84 The Court dis-
avowed the blanket prohibition of section 276, as it could exclude rel-
evant evidence despite its three broad exceptions.85 The majority
indicated that it should be up to the trial judge to determine the rele-
vancy of the evidence, stating that the trial judge's relevancy determi-
nation would provide the complainant with adequate protection s6
The majority noted that there were a number of problems with
the type of rape shield statute that was at issue.87 First, the majority
argued that "[tihe legislation may misdefine the evil to be addressed
as evidence of sexual activity, when in fact the evil to be addressed is
the narrower evil of the misuse of evidence for irrelevant and mislead-
ing purposes .... I" Second, the majority argued that the categories
set out as exceptions to the prohibition in section 276 cannot take into
80. Id.
81. Id. at 604.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 607.
84. Id. at 625.
85. Id. at 612. To illustrate the type of evidence potentially excluded by section 276,
Justice McLachlin discussed the defense of honest belief in consent where such belief was
based on the "sexual acts performed by the complainant at some other time and place."
Id. at 613. Other examples of "relevant" evidence which could be potentially excluded
include: evidence going to the complainant's bias or motivation to fabricate evidence; evi-
dence to rebut evidence introduced by the prosecution of the complainant's physical condi-
tion; and use of pattern conduct to infer similar subsequent conduct. Id. at 614.
86. Id. The court adopted the standard set out in Sweitzer v. The Queen, 1 S.C.RL 949,
953 (1982), which said that "admissibility will depend upon the probative effect of the
evidence balanced against the prejudice caused to the accused by its admission...." This
standard appears to be more restrictive than that followed in most of the United States
jurisdictions, which requires relevant evidence to be admitted unless the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the possible harm. See, e.g., FED. R. EViD. 403. However, in
the discussion following, the majority seems to apply the standard of weighing the proba-
tive value against the harm presented.
87. R v. Seaboyer, 2 S.C.1L at 619. The majority indicated that it was adopting the
arguments set out by Harriet Galvin in Shielding Rape Victimts in the State and Federal
Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. Rnv. 763 (1986).
88. L v. Seaboyer, 2 S.C.R. at 618.
1993]
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account all the possible situations where evidence of the complain-
ant's sexual conduct will be relevant.8 9
The Court's argument justifying the unconstitutionality of section
276 seems to be logical on its face. However, the majority failed to
consider the serious problems leading to the original enactment of
section 276. Specifically, the majority failed to recognize any potential
for prejudice or bias on the part of the judge making the evidentiary
ruling. In addition, the majority gave too much credit to the jury's
ability to understand that the victim's reputation is not the issue at
trial. The majority also failed to consider the desire of the people,
manifested through the legislature, to encourage the reporting of sex-
ual assault and to prevent continued victimization at trial.
B. "Saving" Section 276
1. Charter Section 1
Section 1 of the Charter provides that the rights and freedoms set
out therein are subject only to such "reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic soci-
ety."90 Thus, despite its finding that section 276 was inconsistent with
section 7 and section 11(d), the majority could have upheld section
276 under Charter section 1 by finding it to be a "reasonable limita-
tion." 91 In deciding whether section 1 will "save" legislation as being
a "reasonable limit, demonstrably justified" it must be shown that:
(a) the objective which the limit is designed to serve is of sufficient
importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right;
and (b) the means chosen to attain the objective are reasonable and
demonstrably justified, in that (1) the measures designed to meet
the legislative objective must be rationally connected to the objec-
tive, and (2) the means used should impair as little as possible the
right or freedom in question, and (3) there must be a proportional-
ity between the effects of the means chosen and the legislative
objective.92
Although the majority recognized that the legislation addressed a
pressing and substantial objective, it determined that the legislation
did not impair the accused's rights "as little as possible." 93 Therefore,
the majority held that section 276 could not be saved under section 1
89. Id.
90. CArN. Cor4sT. (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 1.
91. R. v. Seaboyer, 2 S.C.R. at 580.
92. Id. at 702 (citing R. v. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. 103, 138-39 (1986)).
93. Id. at 626.
(Vol. 16
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of the Charter.94 This result is not surprising in light of the majority's
analysis of the constitutionality of section 276. It was apparent
through its traditional approach that the majority would not find that
the interests and needs of the complainant "demonstrably justify" a
"reasonable limitation" on the rights of the accused.
2. Constitutional Exemption
The Ontario Court of Appeal indicated in dicta that the doctrine
of constitutional exemption should apply to prevent section 276 from
being found facially invalidf 5 Under this doctrine the trial judge
would determine if the section, as applied, violated the rights of the
particular defendant before the court.
The majority determined that the doctrine of constitutional ex-
emption did not apply and that it would be inappropriate to determine
the constitutionality of section 276 on a case-by-case basis.96 The ma-
jority reached this conclusion on the basis that constitutional exemp-
tion would not achieve Parliament's purpose for enacting section
276Y Additionally, the majority found that allowing a case-by-case
determination would cause a return to the common law rules."
C. Constitutionality of Section 277
Section 277 provides the complainant limited protection by
preventing the use of sexual history evidence to impeach her credibil-
ity. The majority determined that section 277, unlike section 276, was
constitutional.9 9 As the purpose of introducing evidence of the vic-
tim's sexual history to undermine the victim's credibility is illegiti-
mate, the court held that application of section 277 will not exclude
any relevant evidence. Thus, the majority found that section 277 does
not infringe upon the defendant's right to a fair trial.100
D. State of the Law
After making these constitutional rulings, the majority proceeded
to evaluate the protection afforded complainants in sexual assault
94. Id.
95. Re Seaboyer, 61 O.R. 2d 297 (Ont. C.A.) (1987).
96. R. v. Seaboyer, 2 S.C.R. at 630.
97. Id
98. Id.
99. Id. at 625.
100. Id.
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cases absent the protection of section 276.101 The court determined
that its finding that section 276 was unconstitutional did not revive the
common law rules regarding evidence of the victim's past sexual con-
duct.'02 The majority reached this conclusion on the basis that section
277 still applies to prevent the introduction of inappropriate evi-
dence.103 In addition to the protection afforded by section 277, the
Court found that the trial judge's determinations on relevancy and the
danger of allowing the sexual history evidence provide protection
from the bias of the common law rules.104
The majority established the following guidelines for trial judges
in making a relevancy determination:
1. On a trial for a sexual offence, evidence that the complainant
has engaged in consensual sexual conduct on other occasions (in-
cluding past sexual conduct with the accused) is not admissible
solely to support the inference that the complainant is by reason of
such conduct: (a) more likely to have consented to the sexual con-
duct at issue in the trial; (b) less worthy of belief as a witness.
2. Evidence of consensual sexual conduct on the part of the com-
plainant may be admissible for purposes other than an inference
relating to the consent or credibility of the complainant where it
possesses probative value on an issue in the trial and where that
probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of un-
fair prejudice flowing from the evidence. 105
These guidelines ignore that the judges making the determination of
relevance and admissibility bring their own bias to their determina-
tions. These "guidelines" are little more than a statement of the ordi-
nary balancing test for relevancy and thus give no real guidance. The
overturning of section 276 coupled with the majority's lack of gui-
dance set the stage for the enactment of a new rape shield statute.
IV. DECIDING TO DISSENT
Justice L'Heureux-Dube was joined by Justice Gonthier in issuing
a lengthy dissent to the decision of the majority in Seaboyer.106 On a
purely facial or superficial level, it could be said that issuing a separate
opinion, particularly a dissent, serves no purpose. A dissent is not
101. Id. at 630.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 631.
105. Id. at 634-35.
106. Id. at 643-713.
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law: it did not persuade a majority of the court, and it has no prece-
dential value. Therefore, any dissenting opinion could be classified as
unsuccessful. However, by going beyond a mere win/loss analysis it
becomes apparent that dissents can serve a number of different
functions.
A. Separate Opinions
Choosing to write an opinion separate from that of the majority is
a statement in and of itself. Both dissenting and concurring opinions
are readily issued and seem to be a matter of course in the United
States. However, the same is not true in a number of other countries.
In most civil law jurisdictions, such as France, the decision of the court
is issued in one anonymous, unanimous decision. 107 Such decisions
appear to result from the belief that there is a "right" answer, that the
law has one correct meaning." s England, on the other hand, follows a
tradition of seriatim opinions where each member of the court an-
nounces his or her own individual judgment."° No composite judg-
ment of the court is necessarily issued.' 10
Unlike the seriatim tradition of the English, the decision-making
process of the Canadian Supreme Court calls for the issuance of an
opinion of the court. However, unlike the civil system of France, the
Canadian system also permits the issuance of separate opinions. The
Canadian Supreme Court's process of decision making and opinion
writing is very similar to the process followed by the United States
Supreme Court. After hearing oral arguments, the Justices on the
Supreme Court of Canada meet to discuss the case."' The justices
announce their opinions, starting with the most junior justice, and the
issues presented are then discussed."' After a decision is reached, the
most senior justice, typically the Chief Justice, assigns a justice to write
107. Ruth B. Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 VASH. L Rlv. 133, 134
(1990).
108. Id.
109. Id. Ginsburg indicates that there are two exceptions to the usual British approach.
These exceptions are in the areas of opinions of the Privy Council and in criminal cases.
Id. at 135. Permission of the presiding judge is required to issue a separate opinion in a
criminal case so as not to exacerbate the "discomfiture of the unsuccessful appellant." Id.
110. Id. at 134.
111. McCoMIcK & GREENE, supra note 13, at 201.
112. Id. The debate style practice followed currently in the Supreme Court of Canada
is markedly different from the practice in that court ten years ago when the judges an-
nounced their own individual decisions. Id. at 206. One factor attributed to this change is
that three women now sit on the Supreme Court of Canada, and women are thought to
tend more toward consensual decision making. Id.
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the majority opinion.1' 3 The opinion is written and then circulated to
all the justices who then have an opportunity to make comments and
suggestions which can be incorporated as the author of the opinion
sees fit.114 The other justices may then decide to write separate con-
curring or dissenting opinions." 5 One researcher has noted, however,
that many justices prefer the Court to issue a unanimous decision.116
Such a decision is thought to be the clearest and most unambiguous
way to indicate the Court's present position and probable future
direction." 7
Some commentators, Learned Hand for example, have argued
that the issuance of dissenting opinions diminishes the power of the
majority's decision and may even diminish the legitimacy of the
Court." 8 However, it seems that this very criticism illustrates the im-
portance and impact of dissents. While it is true that the issuance of
dissenting and concurring opinions can lead to confusion, dissents can
be a very powerful and persuasive tool, and their existence should not
be taken for granted. In jurisdictions where dissenting opinions are
issued, they serve a number of different functions.
B. Role of the Dissent
Justice William J. Brennan has noted that dissents serve a number
of functions.1 9 One role of dissents is to point out flaws in the major-
ity's reasoning. 20 In a related role, dissents hold the majority "ac-
countable for the rationale and consequences of its decision," and in
pointing out the limits of the majority's decision, dissents can provide
lower courts and attorneys with ways to distinguish later cases.1 2 ' In
Justice Brennan's view, the most important role of federal court dis-
sents is to guide the state courts in interpreting state constitutions dif-
ferently from the federal constitution. 12 In their most far reaching
role, dissents pave the way for future change in the law.123 In describ-
113. Id. at 201.
114. Id. at 201-02.
115. Id. at 202.
116. Id. at 203.
117. Id. at 204.
118. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HAsTiNos LJ. 427, 429 (1986)
(citing LEARNED HAND, TH-E BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 430.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id
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ing this later role, Justice Brennan characterizes such opinions as
those which "soar with passion and ring with rhetoric... [and] at their
best, straddle the worlds of literature and law."' 2 An additional role
of the dissent not mentioned by Justice Brennan is that in writing a
dissenting opinion, the author is freed from the constraints that ac-
company writing an opinion for the majority. Majority opinions are
expected to progress in a certain way and to reason in a certain man-
ner, focusing on the issue or case before them. The dissenter is not
"making law" and therefore is freed from a number of these expecta-
tions. However, the dissenter does not have completely free rein;
there are bounds of expectation even for a dissenting opinion. If these
boundaries are crossed, the forcefulness or validity of the opinion is
lessened and may even be defeated.
Justice Brennan states a number of laudable goals or roles of the
dissenting opinion. However, deciding to dissent may also have nega-
tive implications. Separate decisions may confuse lower courts and
lawyers as to the position of the Supreme Court, thus making them
unsure where the Court will go in the future. In addition, separate
opinions may cause factions within the court and may lead to difficulty
in reaching future decisions. This observation is particularly true of
dissents that appear to be a personal attack on the author and mem-
bers of the majority. In some cases the justices seem to be bickering
back and forth. Making these feuds public may lead to a decrease in
the perceived legitimacy of the Court.
V. L'HEUREUX-DUBE'S SEABOYER DISSENT
Justice L'Heureux-Dube joined in the Seaboyer majority opinion
as to the constitutionality of section 277.12- However, she dissented
strongly from the majority's finding that section 276 violated sections
7 and 11(d) of the Charter. 26 Justice L'Heureux-Dube's dissent illus-
trates some of the roles of the dissent discussed above. In particular,
it demonstrates how the author of a dissent is free from a number of
the restraints on the majority.
124. Id. at 431.
125. L v. Seaboyer, 2 S.C.Rt at 643.
126. Id at 643 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting).
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A. The Opinion
Justice L'Heureux-Dube's dissent in Seaboyer followed what she
termed a "contextual approach."' 127 In her view, "the constitutional
questions must be examined in their broader political, social and his-
torical context in order to attempt any kind of meaningful analysis of
the constitutional questions."'" The first element of "context" was a
discussion of the crime of sexual assault and an examination of a
number of discriminatory beliefs, termed "rape myths," regarding wo-
men and the crime of sexual assault. 129 Justice L'Heureux-Dube cited
a number of studies, reports, and articles to support her assertion that
these myths surround the crime of sexual assault. According to Jus-
tice L'Heureux-Dube, these myths pervade every step in the process
of a sexual assault case: from the decision of the complainant to report
the incident, to the determination by the police of whether the com-
plaint is "founded," to the decision of the prosecutor to pursue the
claim, to the decisions of a judge and jury in the small number of cases
that proceed to trial. 30
The second element of "context" was a discussion of the "Larger
Legal Context.''1 31 Justice L'Heureux-Dube described the evolution
of the evidentiary rules regarding sexual conduct evidence from the
127. Id. at 647.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 648-65. These "rape myths" include:
1. The idea that a woman cannot be raped against her will.
2. The myth that rapists are strangers.
3. Categorization of women as either good or bad.
4. Discrediting the victim and assuming she consented.
5. If a woman is not visibly shaken it is assumed she was not assaulted.
6. The contradictory ideas that an assaulted woman will report the assault im-
mediately or that she will be too ashamed to report it.
7. Women will cry rape as a means of revenge.
8. A woman will consent to sex and then claim she was assaulted because she
fears reprisal from a husband or parent.
9. The myth that females make up stories of sexual assault.
10. The myth that rapists are stereotypically violent strangers.
Id. at 666-78.
130. Id. It is interesting to note that after the Seaboyer decision the Crown dropped the
cases against both Steven Seaboyer and Nigel Gayme. One reason given for the with-
drawal in both cases was the reluctance of the complainant to proceed. When the Crown
announced dropping the charges against Gayme, it was stated that the victim did not wish
to testify again. See Gary Oakes, Victim Won't Testify in "Rape Shield" Case, TORONTO
STAR, Nov. 23, 1991, at A10; Gary Oakes, Sex Charge Dropped in "Rape Shield" Case,
TORONTO STAR, Feb. 19, 1992, at A24; and Gary Oakes, Crown Withdraws Charges in
"Rape Shield" Case, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 20, 1992, at A2.
131. R. v. Seaboyer, 2 S.C.R. at 665 (L'Heureux-Dube, J., dissenting).
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common law through the Reform Act of 1982, up to and including
section 276.1 2 After exploring the various approaches taken regard-
ing sexual history evidence, Justice L'Heureux-Dube discussed "Rele-
vancy and Admissibility at Common Law and Under the Legislative
Provisions."' She reasoned that "rape myths" pervade any deter-
mination of the relevancy of sexual history evidence, as these myths
will inform the judge's experience, common sense, and logic.'3 Due
to the mythical basis of the relevancy determinations, she argued that
most evidence of the complainant's prior sexual history is irrelevant
and properly excluded by section 276.'3s In addition, any relevant
sexual history evidence would be admissible under the three statutory
exceptions to section 276.136 Even if potentially relevant evidence
were excluded, Justice L'Heureux-Dube argued that the value of any
such evidence would be substantially outweighed by its dangers.137
Therefore, in her opinion, section 276 did not violate the Charter's
provision of fundamental fairness. In fact, Justice L'Heureux-Dube
argued that fundamental fairness requires the opposite result, as fun-
damental fairness includes not only the rights of the accused, but also
takes into account the interests of the complainant and of society in
general." 8 These latter interests would be served by the exclusion of
irrelevant evidence as the truth-finding goal of the trial would be
enhanced.39
B. The Role of L'Heureux-Dube's Dissent
Justice L'Heureux-Dube's dissent satisfies a number of the roles
discussed previously. First, though not explicitly, her dissent points
out flaws in the reasoning of the majority. Justice L'Heureux-Dube
implicitly asserts that the majority failed to recognize the pervasive-
ness of the rape myths and perhaps even that the reasoning of the
majority was influenced by these myths. In so doing, it is possible that
this dissent will also serve a negative function by creating a faction or
division on the Supreme Court of Canada.
One function of dissents that is clearly illustrated by Justice
L'Heureux-Dube's Seaboyer dissent is the ability of the dissenter to
132. Id.
133. Id. at 679.
134. Id. at 679-81.
135. Id. at 681-82.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 690-91.
138. Id. at 696-701.
139. Id.
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reason or argue in ways different from those of the majority. In her
discussion of the discriminatory beliefs surrounding sexual assault,
Justice L'Heureux-Dube cited no fewer than thirty-two reports, arti-
cles, and studies regarding the crime of sexual assault and its effects.
The use of social science data is not widely accepted in judicial deci-
sion-making. 4° However, one notable use of social science data is
seen in Justice Harlan's dissent in Lochner v. New York,"' in which he
cited the negative effects long hours and poor working conditions had
on the health of bakers. The use of such social science data can be
traced through the Court's decision in Muller v. Oregon142 where, in-
fluenced by the "Brandeis Brief," the Court sustained a regulation on
the working hours of women. Finally, the social science data can be
traced in the eventual overturning of Lochner in Bunting v. Oregon.143
These cases exemplify a positive function of the dissent in employing
alternative reasoning and they illustrate how such reasoning can gain
eventual acceptance in a majority opinion.
Justice L'Heureux-Dube's dissent similarly employs social science
data. However, Justice L'Heureux-Dube's reasoning is not persua-
sive. Recognizing the role law plays in society and the effects of socie-
tal influences on the law, as was done by Justice L'Heureux-Dube in
Seaboyer, is an important goal. However, judicial recognition of these
considerations must conform to some of the usual restraints on judi-
cial decision-making in order to be persuasive and indeed for the
court to be recognized as a legitimate institution. While the restraints
on the author of a dissent are less burdensome than those on the au-
thor of the majority opinion, they still exist.
Justice L'Heureux-Dube's dissent oversteps one of the few limits
placed on the author of a dissenting opinion. In the Seaboyer dissent
Justice L'Heureux-Dube stepped out of the realm of the judiciary and
into the realm of the legislature. Although compelling, the litany of
social science data regarding sexual assault and the pervasiveness of
rape myths seems better suited to the halls of Parliament. By stepping
out of the usual judicial sphere, Justice L'Heureux-Dube lost credibil-
ity. Thus, her dissent carries less force, and unfortunately the strength
140. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social
Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1008 (1989).
141. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
142. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
143. 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
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of her argument is greatly diminished.14 'This is not to say that Justice
L'Heureux-Dube's dissent will not serve a role similar to that evi-
denced by the Lochner line of cases. If such a role is to be served, it
will be due to the enactment of the new Canadian rape shield statute.
The information in the preamble to the legislation that was enacted
subsequent to the Seaboyer decision, discussed in depth in the next
section, sounds a great deal like the information discussed by Justice
L'Heureux-Dube in her dissent. Arguably, Justice L'Heureux-Dube's
opinion influenced Parliament in the enactment of the new legislation.
In addition, as such information can now be attributed to Parliament,
it may be possible for Justice L'Heureux-Dube's reasoning to carry a
majority of the Court in the future.
VI. POST-SEABOYER LEGISLATION
Almost immediate reactions, both in support and opposition,
were seen in response to the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court
in R. v. Seaboyer.145 On one hand, people supported the need to pro-
tect the rights of the accused; on the other hand, there was an outcry
for greater recognition of the rights of the complainant and a call for
new legislation.1' 6 Former Justice Minister Kim Campbell responded
to this call by introducing Bill C-49, which became commonly known
as the "No Means No Bill," in the House of Commons on December
12, 1991. Just as controversy surrounded the Seaboyer decision, Jus-
tice Minister Campbell's proposal received a mixed reaction.1 47 De-
144. For a discussion of the necessity of feminist argumentation, see Elizabeth A.
Sheehy, Feminist Argumentation Before the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Seaboyer; R.
v. Gayme: The Sound of One Hand Clapping, 18 MEu3. U. L. REv. 450 (1991).
145. See, eg., Martha Shaffer, Seaboyer v. R.: A Case Conunent, 5 CAN. J. Wo.1L'N & L
202 (1992). See also, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 23, 1991, at Al, 11; TORONTo STAR, Aug. 24,
1991, at D2; MAcLAN,'s, Sept. 2, 1991, at 45.
A Gallup poll taken shortly after the decision in Seaboyer indicates that 55% of
Canadians polled thought that evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct is irrelevant
while 36% believed such behavior was relevant trial evidence. The poll also broke the
results down by gender showing that 45% of the males polled thought such evidence would
be relevant in a sexual assault trial with only 28% of the females polled joining in that
opinion. See Sex History Irrelevan4 Most Say, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 13, 1992, at All.
146. Mark Tait, Rape Law Angers Women, CALGARY HERAmD, Aug. 23, 1991, at Al.
147. See Brian Brennan, Doubts Raised Over Proposed Rape Law, CALGARY HERAM,
Dec. 19,1991, at D10; Rape Shield Law Victimizes the Accused, TiE GAzErE (Montreal),
Dec. 29, 1991, at B3; Michele Landsberg, Proposed New Rape Law Has Revitalized Femi-
nist Energy, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 28, 1992, at J1; "No Means No" Draws Attacks,
MAcrEN 's, June 1, 1992, § Canada, at 14; Sheila McIntyre, Bill C49 Will Protect the
Rights of Women, FIN. PosT, June 8, 1992, at S4; A. Kim Campbell, Justice View, OttAWA
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spite vocal opposition, Parliament amended the Camadian Criminal
Code and passed a "new" rape shield statute on June 23, 1992.148
As part of this new legislation, section 273 was added to the Ca-
nadian Criminal Code. 49 Section 273.1 provides a definition of "con-
sent" as it is used in other portions of the Code.'50 Section 273.2 goes
on to add an important limitation to the defense of consent, not previ-
ously present, providing that consent is not a defense where belief in
consent results from the accused's "self-induced intoxication" or
"reckless or wilful blindness" or if "the accused did not take reason-
able steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, to
ascertain that the complainant was consenting."' 1
Revised section 276 is the actual "rape shield" provision. It
provides:
(1) [E]vidence that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity,
whether with the accused or with any other person, is not admissible
to support an inference that, by reason of the sexual nature of that
activity, that complainant
(a) is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that
forms the subject-matter of the charge; or
(b) is less worthy of belief.
(2) In proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsec-
tion (1), no evidence shall be adduced by or on behalf of the ac-
cused that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity other than
the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge,
whether with the accused or with any other person, unless the judge,
provincial court judge or justice determines.... that the evidence
(a) is of specific instances of sexual activity;
(b) is relevant to an issue at trial; and
(c) has significant probative value that is not substantially out-
weighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of
justice. (emphasis added). 5 2
"New" section 276 contains some important features which dis-
tinguish it from its predecessor. First, former section 276, overruled in
Seaboyer and repealed by the new legislation, only pertained to the
CrrzEN, June 22, 1992, at A12; Ken Haberman, Rape Shield Bill Has Horrid Flaws, FIN.
Postr, June 22, 1992, at S5.
148. The Canadian Criminal Code was amended by adding sections 273.1 and 273.2 and
by repealing section 276 and replacing it with sections 276-276.4.
149. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 273.
150. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 273.1.
151. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 273.2.
152. Id. § 276.
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exclusion of evidence of "sexual activity of the complainant with a
person other than the accused" (emphasis added). The new legislation,
however, makes its provisions explicitly applicable to previous sexual
activity between the accused and the complainant. Arguably, this pro-
vision makes new section 276 far more restrictive than its predecessor.
However, it does not appear that this distinction will lead to the exclu-
sion of more evidence since "new" section 276 is not a blanket prohi-
bition with a few narrow exceptions as was its predecessor. Instead,
"new" section 276 indicates that the trial judge will determine the ad-
missibility of the sexual history evidence. It seems that new section
276 does just what Justice L'Heureux-Dube feared: it leaves the rele-
vancy analysis to the judge and leaves the door open to the influence
of prejudicial rape myths. However, the judge will not perform the
usual relevancy analysis, which provides that evidence is generally ad-
missible, unless it is shown that its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Rather, in the case of
sexual history evidence, section 276, subdivision (2) begins with the
assumption that such evidence is inadmissible and will only be allowed
if the judge determines that the evidence has significant probative
value which is not outweighed by the "danger of prejudice to the
proper administration of justice."'1 53 In addition to this "stricter" rele-
vancy analysis, section 276(3) goes on to constrain the judge's deter-
mination of relevancy by listing a number of specific factors which the
judge shall consider when deciding upon the admissibility of sexual
history evidence.' 54 This section provides that:
In determining whether evidence is admissible under subsection (2),
the judge... shall take into account
(a) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to
make a full answer and defence;
(b) society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault
offences;
(c) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will
assist in arriving at a just determination in the case;
(d) the need to remove from the fact-finding process any discrimi-
natory belief of bias;
(e) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of
prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury;
(f) the potential prejudice to the complainant's personal dignity
and right of privacy;
153. Id. § 276(2)(c).
154. Id. § 276(3).
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(g) the right of the complainant and of every individual to per-
sonal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law; and
(h) any other factor that the judge ... considers relevant. 155
The provisions of the new Canadian rape shield statute outlined
above are the bases for the protection that will now be afforded the
complainant in a sexual assault case. However, of particular interest
are the provisions of the Preamble to the amendments discussed
above. The Preamble provides:
Whereas the Parliament of Canada is gravely concerned about the
incidence of sexual violence and abuse in Canadian society and, in
particular, the prevalence of sexual assault against women and
children;
Whereas the Parliament of Canada recognizes the unique character
of the offence of sexual assault and how sexual assault and more
particularly, the fear of sexual assault affects the lives of the people
of Canada;
Whereas the Parliament of Canada intends to promote and help to
ensure the full protection of the rights guaranteed under sections 7
and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;
Whereas the Parliament of Canada wishes to encourage the report-
ing of incidents of sexual violence or abuse, and to provide for the
prosecution of offences within a framework of laws that are consis-
tent with the principles of fundamental justice and that are fair to
complainants as well as to accused persons;
Whereas the Supreme Court of Canada has declared the existing
section 276 of the Criminal Code to be of no force and effect;
And Whereas the Parliament of Canada believes that at trials of
sexual offences, evidence of the complainant's sexual history is
rarely relevant and that its admission should be subject to particular
scrutiny, bearing in mind the inherently prejudicial character of
such evidence .... 156
The provisions of the Preamble, along with section 276(3), address a
number of the concerns raised by Justice L'Heureux-Dube. As dis-
cussed previously, Justice L'Heureux-Dube's Seaboyer dissent served
a number of roles. Arguably, her dissent also played a role in the
fashioning of this new legislation. It seems that a number of the con-
cerns outlined by Justice L'Heureux-Dube were echoed by Parliament
in its stated reasons for the enactment of "new" section 276.
155. Id. § 276.
156. Md § 276.
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The new rape shield statute appears to be a compromise position
between those taken by the majority and the dissent in Seaboyer.
New section 276 is more restrictive than the state of the law proposed
by the majority in Seaboyer. Where the majority would have left the
admissibility of sexual history evidence to the usual judicial determi-
nation of relevancy, new section 276 constrains that decision by im-
posing a stricter relevancy determination and requiring a number of
factors which the judge must consider. On the other hand, new sec-
tion 276 does not appear to address all the concerns raised by Justice
L'Heureux-Dube, although the judge's decision-making is con-
strained, there is still room for the influence of the rape myths to
creep in. What new section 276 does appear to do, however, is to
provide the fuel to allow the statute to withstand constitutional scru-
tiny. As discussed above, Justice L'Heureux-Dube's dissent lost credi-
bility as she seemed to be stepping into the role of the legislature.
However, the preamble to new section 276 now raises a number of the
same points and attributes them to Parliament's purpose for enacting
this law. As such, they can now be cited by the Court and attributed
to Parliament, thereby achieving both the purpose of recognizing the
influence of the infornation and maintaining the legitimacy of the
Court.
VII. CONCLUSION
The introduction of a complainant's sexual history as evidence in
a sexual assault trial raises questions concerning the rights of the com-
plainant as well as the rights of the defendant to a fair trial. Canada
has had a number of approaches to this problem ranging from the
common law, where the introduction of such evidence was fairly rou-
tine, to the strict "Michigan Model," which the Canadian Supreme
Court struck down in R. v. Seaboyer. Canada now has a new rape
shield statute. As of the writing of this Note, "new" section 276 has
not been subjected to a constitutional challenge, but due to the con-
troversy surrounding its enactment, one is almost sure to follow.
It is unclear whether "new" section 276 will withstand such a
challenge. One thing is clear: the reasoning and argumentation em-
ployed by Justice L'Heureux-Dube in her dissent will now be given
greater weight as Parliament has explicitly cited similar reasoning as
its purpose for the enactment of "new" section 276. If a constitutional
challenge to new section 276 reaches the Canadian Supreme Court,
perhaps Justice L'Heureux-Dube will be the author of the majority
opinion.
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